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Abstract
Miscalibration can be deﬁned as the fact that people think that their
knowledge is more precise than it actually is. In a typical miscalibration
experiment, subjects are asked to provide subjective conﬁdence intervals. A
very robust ﬁnding is that subjects provide too narrow intervals at the 90%
level. As a result a lot less than 90% of correct answers fall inside the 90%
intervals provided. As miscalibration is linked with bad results on an exper-
imental ﬁnancial market (Biais et al., 2005) and entrepreneurial success is
positively correlated with good calibration (Regner et al., 2006), it appears
interesting to look for a way to cure or at least reduce miscalibration. Previ-
ous attempts to remove the miscalibration bias relied on extremely long and
tedious procedures. Here, we design an experimental setting that provides
several diﬀerent incentives, in particular strong monetary incentives; i.e. that
make miscalibration costly. Our main result is that a thirty-minute training
session has an eﬀect on men’s calibration but no eﬀect on women’s.
Résumé
On désigne par l’anglicisme "miscalibration" le fait que les individus
pensent que leur savoir est plus précis qu’il ne l’est en réalité. On mesure
typiquement la miscalibration en demandant aux sujets de fournir des inter-
valles de conﬁance à 90% pour une série de questions. Or, de nombreuses
études (voir Lichtenstein and Fischhhoﬀ (1977) pour une revue de littéra-
ture) montrent que le taux de réponses correctes appartenant aux intervalles
à 90% fournis est toujours bien inférieur à 90%. On parle alors de miscal-
ibration dans la mesure où les individus fournissent des intervalles à 90%
trop étroits. Les liens existant entre la miscalibration et de mauvaises per-
formances économiques (Biais et al. (2005), Regner et al. (2006)) expliquent
l’intérêt pour les économistes d’étudier ce biais.
Notre protocole expérimental vise à réduire la miscalibration par le biais
d’incitations directes, notamment monétaires. Notre résultat principal est
que nos incitations ont un eﬀet sur la calibration des hommes, ceux ayant
suivi notre entrainement fournissant des intervalles plus larges, mais aucun
eﬀet tangible sur celle des femmes.
JEL Codes: D81, C91.
Keywords: miscalibration, overconﬁdence, incentives, gender eﬀect.
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1 Introduction
In the past decades Economists and Psychologists documented a long list of
biases , i.e. substantial and systematic deviations from the predictions of
standard economic theory 1. Many economists will argue that these biases
only matter if they survive in an economic environment. In other words, if
correct incentives are provided subjects should realize that they are making
costly mistakes and then change the way they make such decisions in further
decision tasks. In this paper we test this claim regarding a particular bias,
namely miscalibration. We then create an experimental setting that provides
a lot of incentives (decisions have monetary consequences, successful others
can be imitated, feedbacks are provided, repeated trials are used, etc). Fi-
nally, we test in a subsequent decision task whether subjects still display
some miscalibration.
What is miscalibration and why is it important to economists?
Calibration is related to the capacity of an individual to choose a given level of
risk. In a typical experiment designed to measure miscalibration, subjects are
asked to provide subjective conﬁdence intervals. For example, if the question
is "What was the unemployment rate in France for the ﬁrst trimester of
2007?" and the subject provides the 90% conﬁdence interval [7%,15%], it
means that the subject thinks that there is a 90% chance that this interval
contains the correct answer. A perfectly calibrated subject’s intervals should
contain the correct answer 90% of the time. In fact, a robust ﬁnding is that
almost all subjects are miscalibrated. On average, 90% subjective conﬁdence
intervals only contains the correct answer between, say, 30% and 50% of the
time 2. Glaser et al. (2005) found an even stronger miscalibration using
professional traders.
Miscalibration is a bias having important economic consequences, since
miscalibrated people suﬀer losses on experimental markets (Bonnefon et al.,
2005, Biais et al., 2005). Furthermore, it is likely that such a pathology
aﬀects the behavior of real traders acting on real markets. Therefore, it does
make sense for economists to try to reduce miscalibration and to study the
1A list of almost a hundred of such biases can be found at
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases
2see Lichtenstein and Fischhhoff (1977) for a survey and (Klayman et al., 1999) for
variables that affect miscalibration
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best incentives to do so.
Lichtenstein and Fischhoﬀ (1980) attempted to reduce miscalibration by
providing subjects with feedback on their performance. They proved that
23 sessions, each lasting about an hour, were required to substantially im-
prove subjects’ calibration. Several other psychologists have used various
techniques to reduce miscalibration (Pickhardt and Wallace, 1974, Adams
and Adams, 1958), with little success so far. Miscalibration thus appears to
be a very robust bias.
This paper proposes to provide a maximum of incentives to reduce mis-
calibration. The main result is that our experimental setting succeeds in
reducing overconﬁdent miscalibration but only for males.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
experimental design. Section 3 presents the results and section 4 discusses
them. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Experimental design
The measure of miscalibration and associated overconﬁdence relies on a now
standard protocol. Subjects have to provide 90% subjective conﬁdence inter-
vals for a set of 10 quiz questions. On average, perfectly calibrated subjects
should catch the correct answer 9 times; if this is not the case, they are
miscalibrated. 3 The subjects are asked to estimate their hit rate. The
diﬀerence between their estimated hit rate and their actual one is a classical
measure of overconﬁdence. This protocol will thus serve as a benchmark for
measuring miscalibration and overconﬁdence in our experiment.
The experimental subjects were divided into two groups. The subjects
of the ﬁrst group attended a training session and then performed a baseline
treatment aiming at measuring their miscalibration according to the stan-
dard protocol. The principle of this training session is to oﬀer a whole set of
experimental incentives that enhance learning (monetary incentives, tourna-
ment, feedback, loss framing). The second group, the control group, performs
the baseline treatment only.
3Note that we cannot say of a single subject who only catches the correct answer in his
90% intervals, say, 6 times out of 10 that he is miscalibrated. Nevertheless, we can say of
a population of subjects for which on average 6 correct answers out of 10 belong to the
90% intervals provided and with no subject catching 9 correct answers or more that it is
globally miscalibrated.
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At ﬁrst glance, testing the eﬀect of incentives seems possible by simply
providing incentives for the basic miscalibration task used as a benchmark.
This seems natural but cannot be implemented since there is no simple in-
centive scheme that rewards correct calibration. Think, for example, of an
incentive scheme that would pay a high reward if the diﬀerence between the
required percentage of hit rates, say 90%, and the actual hit rate (measured
over a set of 10 questions) is small. A rational subject can use very wide
intervals for 9 questions and a very small one for the remaining question.
He is thus certain to appear correctly calibrated, while he is not. Cesarini
et al. (2006) chose to provide incentives for the evaluation of the calibration
task only (how many correct answers belong to the intervals provided by the
subject and by his peers) and made miscalibrated subjects go through the
task again. We chose to consider a task similar to the calibration task in
which we can provide the necessary incentives. This task, described in the
following section aims at making the subjects realize they have a hard time
calibrating the level of risk they wish to take. After having completed this
training task, subjects have to complete a standard calibration task for which
we only provide incentives for the following evaluation of how subjects did in
the calibration task as in Cesarini et al. (2006). A control group who did not
go through the training task also completed the calibration task to enable us
to measure the eﬀect of the training task.
2.1 The training period
In the training period, the participants were asked to answer a set of twenty
questions: ten questions on general knowledge followed by ten questions on
economic knowledge.
The set of questions used in the training period was composed of ten
questions some of which were used in Biais et al. (2005)’s experiment plus
10 questions on economic culture. Half of the subjects had to answer the 20
questions in a given order, the other half saw the questions in reverse order.
This enabled us to check for learning eﬀects during the training period.
In this training period, the subjects were provided with a reference in-
terval for each question that they could be 100% sure the correct answer
belonged to. Subjects had to give an interval included in the reference inter-
val. Each player received an initial endowment of 2000 ECUs (knowing that
they would be converted into euros at the end of the experiment at the rate
of 1 euro for 100 ECUs) before beginning to answer the questions but after
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having received instructions. They were told that 100 ECUs were at stake
for each one of the twenty questions resulting in a loss framing. The payoﬀs
are expressed in experimental currency (ECU). The payoﬀ rule applied for
each question was the following. :
payment =


−100 ∗ width of the interval provided
width of the interval of reference
if the correct answer belongs
to the interval provided
−100 otherwise
According to this formula, the payoﬀ is maximal and equal to 0 when the
interval provided by the subject is a unique value, this value being the right
answer to the question. In this case, the subject keeps the total 100 ECUs
at stake for the question considered.
The payoﬀ is equal to -100 (the subject loses the 100 points) if the subject
provides the reference interval and consequently takes no risk at all.
There is therefore a trade-oﬀ between the risk taking and the amount
of ECUs a subject could keep if the correct answer fell inside his interval.
High risk taking is rewarded by a small loss (the subject keeps most of the
ECUs at stake) in the case where the answer belongs to the interval provided.
Conversely, a subject who only takes little risk will only keep a few ECUs (
meaning he would lose most of the ECUs at stake) even if the correct answer
does belong to his interval.
Subjects had 60 seconds to answer each question, indicated by a timer.
We applied this time constraint so as to not make the fastest subjects wait
too long before switching to the next question as all subjects had to have
answered a question before moving to the next one to enable us to provide
feedback about the intervals provided for a given question. Nevertheless, we
picked the time limit corresponding to the time it took for most subjects to
answer a question in the pilot experiment where there was no time constraint.
When time was up, if the subject had not validated his interval, the 100 ECUs
at stake were lost and the next question was put.
Subjects received feedback providing them with the intervals chosen by all
the participants (including themselves) ranked by width from the narrower
to the wider as well as the payoﬀ corresponding to each interval. They could
infer from this feedback whether they had taken too much risk compared to
the others. They could also see the ranking of everybody’s score after each
question so as to trigger a sense of competition.
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After they had answered all 20 questions, subjects were asked to write a
comment about their strategy. They then received general feedback about
the ﬁrst step of the experiment.
People being miscalibrated, we expected them to realize it when they saw that
the correct answer fell outside their interval less or more often than they had
expected, which resulted in a loss of money. As a result, we expected them to
better adjust the level of risk they wished to take for the next questions. For
instance, a subject quite conﬁdent that he knows the answer who provides
in consequence a narrow interval will be likely to be more cautious when he
realizes he did not catch the right answer. On the contrary, a subject who
decides to be safe and provides a wide interval for a question he thinks he
knows the answer to, will tend to be less cautious for the next questions when
he realizes he could have kept more ECUs by giving a narrower interval. They
could also infer information about the right level of risk to take by looking
at what others did and how it paid.
2.2 The standard calibration task
In the next stage, the subjects who had participated in the training period
were asked to answer a set of ten questions (ﬁve questions on general knowl-
edge followed by ﬁve questions on economic knowledge) by giving their best
estimation of the answer and then by providing 10%, 50% and 90% conﬁdence
intervals. Subjects in the control group had to complete the same task. Af-
ter the pilot experiment was run, we removed and replaced the most diﬃcult
questions for which subjects seemed to have no clue about the answer.
Before the beginning, subjects were explained in detail what were 10%,
50% and 90% conﬁdence intervals. They were also told that they would
receive remuneration regarding this task but that they would only know
how the remuneration was established later. As in Cesarini et al. (2006),
their remuneration for the calibration tasks depended on the evaluation the
subjects were asked to make afterwards of their and the average subject’s
performance during the calibration task. There was no feedback between the
questions and subjects could proceed at their own pace.
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3 Results
The experiment took place at the laboratory of experimental economics of the
University of the Sorbonne (Paris 1) in July 2007. 87 subjects, most of whom
were students, participated in the experiment. 53 students went through the
training period before they completed the calibration task, while the control
group was composed of 34 subjects. The average subject was 22.42 years
old in the control group and 22.71 years old in the trained group. The
proportion of men was respectively 41.18% and 41.5% in the control and the
trained groups. The average earning was 11.16 euros. On average, subjects
earned 10.62 euros including a 5 euros show-up fee in the control group and
14.24 euros (8.42 for the training period and 5.82 for the calibration task)
with no show-up fee for the trained group.
In the following section, we distinguish between two measures of conﬁ-
dence. First, the diﬀerence between the actual hit rate and the required hit
rate, for 10%, 50% and 90% conﬁdence intervals. This diﬀerence measures
the miscalibration. Second, the diﬀerence between the subject’s estimated hit
rate and his actual hit rate. This second diﬀerence represents the conﬁdence
for the calibration task. It is thus another a measure of overconﬁdence.
3.1 General results on calibration
We ﬁnd that the subjects from the control group exhibit a high level of
miscalibration. Indeed, a lot more than one correct answer out of ten belong
to the 10% intervals while fewer than ﬁve correct answers out of ten fall
inside the 50% conﬁdence intervals and far fewer than nine correct answers
out of ten fall inside the 90% intervals. The average hit rates in the control
group at the 10%, 50% and 90% levels are respectively 2.03, 3.32 and 4.81
while the corresponding median hit rates are respectively 2, 3 and 5. T-tests
show that the observed hit rates signiﬁcantly (p<0.001 for the 3 tests) diﬀer
from the expected hit rates (respectively 1, 5 and 9 at the 10%, 50% and
90% levels).
At the 10% level, people are found to be under-conﬁdent, meaning that they
provide too wide intervals. As a result, the correct answer belongs too often
to the 10% intervals. This result was expected by Cesarini et al. (2006).
At the 50% and 90% levels conversely, subjects display overconﬁdence as
their intervals are too narrow, this is all the more the case for 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The fact that far fewer than 90% of correct answers belong to the
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90% conﬁdence intervals of the subjects is in line with the results of Glaser
et al. (2005).
A surprising feature is that, when asked to evaluate how many correct answers
belong to their intervals, the average answers are respectively at the 10%, 50%
and 90% levels: 3.47, 5.56 and 8.04 for the control group; subjects exhibit
overconﬁdence for the calibration task, thinking that they were more cautious
than they actually were (see Figure 1). Let us, nevertheless, observe that
subjects do predict that their calibration is far from being perfect, otherwise
their evaluations would have been 1, 5 and 9.
Figure 1. Expected, Actual and Estimated Hit Rates in the Control Group
These results indicate that not only are people unable to adjust the width
of their intervals to the risk level indicated (they are miscalibrated) but they
are also unable to predict their bias correctly (they are over or underconﬁ-
dent).
To sum up, people seem to overestimate their underconﬁdence and underes-
timate their overconﬁdence.
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3.2 The effect of training on miscalibration and confi-
dence in calibration
3.2.1 The general picture
The main purpose of this paper was to see whether a training period during
which several incentives aiming at improving people’s calibration as well as
decreasing overconﬁdence were provided would be eﬃcient.
Trained subjects have only slightly higher hit rates at the 10%, 50% and 90%
level than subjects from the control group (see ﬁgure 2). The diﬀerences in
hit rates between the control and the trained group are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent at any reasonable level. 4
Figure 2. Hit Rates: Control vs Trained Group
We ﬁnd that the median 10% interval width is larger for the trained group
than for the control group for 7 questions out of ten. For the 3 remaining
4The hit rates are respectively at the 10%, 50% and 90% levels 2.03, 3.32 and 4.81 for
the control group and 2.40, 3.80 and 5.33 for the trained group.
10
questions, the median width of intervals is equal across treatments. Note
that this goes in the sense of a worsening of the underconﬁdent miscalibration
observed at 10% as people tend to provide too wide intervals at 10%. One
reason why we may ﬁnd such a result is that subjects may not consider the
underconﬁdent miscalibration as a bias and consequently, they may not try
to correct it.
The same result is found when we compare median widths of 50% in-
tervals (wider intervals in the trained group than in the control group for 7
questions, the reverse for 1 question and equal median intervals across treat-
ments for the 2 remaining questions). As for 90% intervals, for six questions
out of ten the interval width is larger for the trained group while the control
group provided wider intervals than the trained group for 1 question. 5
We report the regressions of the interval width of the 10%, 50% and 90%
intervals on the sex of the subject, a treatment dummy (=1 if the subject
was in the trained group), the interaction between sex and treatment, the
age of the subject, his level of education, dummies for the diﬀerent questions
and the interactions between each question and the treatment (see Table 1).
We only ﬁnd the interaction terms between questions 9 and 10 and the treat-
ment to be signiﬁcant and positive in explaining the 50% and 90% interval
widths and only the interaction between question 9 and the treatment for
the 10% interval width. The treatment makes subjects provide wider 50%
and 90% intervals for the last two questions only and it only has a signiﬁcant
and positive eﬀect for the 10% interval width of the 9th question. Note that
the level of education has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the 10% inter-
val width, meaning that more educated subjects tend to provide wider 10%
intervals and, by doing so, make their underconﬁdent miscalibration worse.
We ran logistic regressions of the dummies "the 10% interval contains the
5If we compare average interval widths, which seems less relevant as averages are sen-
sitive to extreme values, we find that for 7 (6) questions out of ten the average width of
10% and 50% (respectively 90%) intervals are larger for the trained subjects, while for the
remaining 3 (respectively 4) questions, the opposite is true.
Checking for the significance of these results with a T-test, we find significantly larger
intervals for the trained group than for the control group only for the ninth question, all
other differences being not significant. However, as variances of interval widths are often
very different across the control and trained group and as a way of eliminating the influ-
ence of extreme values, we ran a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. We found that the 90%
interval widths are significantly different (either at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels) for 5 ques-
tions out of ten while 10% and 50% intervals widths are significantly different respectively
for 3 and 6 questions out of ten.
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correct answer" (ICA10), "the 50% interval contains the correct answer"
(ICA50), "the 90% interval contains the correct answer" (ICA90) on the
same variables (see Table 2). We observe that the treatment signiﬁcantly
increases the probability for the correct answer to fall in the 50% and 90%
intervals provided for almost all of the questions (the interaction terms be-
tween the questions and the treatment are always positive and almost always
signiﬁcant). It is true but to a smaller extent for the 10% intervals. If any-
thing, our treatment seems to make subjects provide wider intervals (even
if this result is far from always reaching signiﬁcance) and it signiﬁcantly
helps subjects catch the correct answer in their conﬁdence intervals more of-
ten. Consequently, the incentives we provided during a short training period
decrease the overconﬁdent miscalibration we observe for the 50% and 90%
intervals but, to a smaller extent, makes the underconﬁdent miscalibration
noticed for the 10% intervals worse.
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Table 1. Regression of the Interval Width of the 10, 50 and 90% intervals
Variable IW10 IW50 IW90 Variable IW10 IW50 IW90
Intercept 125.84063 416.64290 974.49453 q8 -10.39409 -2.99125 0.27977
(0.8355) (0.6064) (0.4887) (0.9850) (0.9968) (0.9998)
Sexe -221.24101 -104.93675 -142.78895 q9 1263.63443 2579.99145 4656.41259
(0.3532) (0.7413) (0.7963) (0.0234) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Treatment 1.07455 117.31259 38.72279 q10 2578.44365 3218.39626 5653.13829
(0.9984) (0.8682) (0.9749) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Sextreatment -39.47164 -301.76110 -79.12153 q2t 25.67114 14.36466 -8.85863
(0.8976) (0.4608) (0.9115) (0.9706) (0.9877) (0.9956)
Age -16.75927 -26.84761 -52.72680 q3t 19.30381 20.47461 9.87337
(0.4453) (0.3595) (0.3011) (0.9778) (0.9824) (0.9951)
Education 124.22768 86.61469 103.67302 q4t 22.85979 11.05745 -0.38585
(0.0437) (0.2915) (0.4680) (0.9735) (0.9904) (0.9998)
q2 -14.99427 -6.77144 3.75704 q5t 26.64393 27.93839 9.36834
(0.9787) (0.9928) (0.9977) (0.9692) (0.9758) (0.9953)
q3 0.97352 5.56138 23.04869 q6t 166.74804 385.80898 378.93786
(0.9986) (0.9941) (0.9859) (0.8089) (0.6750) (0.8129)
q4 -12.27096 -4.65000 -1.22460 q7t 21.55222 7.43665 -7.34203
(0.9823) (0.9950) (0.9992) (0.9753) (0.9936) (0.9964)
q5 21.94779 65.72500 144.65040 q8t 9.55972 -0.79798 -7.32431
(0.9683) (0.9290) (0.9102) (0.9890) (0.9993) (0.9964)
q6 214.38529 424.72500 795.61915 q9t 1491.34561 2079.03348 3883.31485
(0.6980) (0.5646) (0.5352) (0.0315) (0.0247) (0.0159)
q7 -15.84730 -15.23552 -16.28074 q10t 365.86894 3434.60974 6956.96248
(0.9774) (0.9837) (0.9900) (0.5997) (0.0002) (<.0001)
Note: p-values are in brackets.
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Table 2. Logistic Regression of "the 10, 50, 90% interval contains the correct
answer" (ICA10 ICA50 ICA90)
Variable ICA10 ICA50 ICA90 Variable ICA10 ICA50 ICA90
Intercept -0.7402 0.4416 1.3924 q8 -1.1865 -1.8656 -1.4668
(0.2799) (0.4948) (0.0392) (0.0656) (0.0019) (0.0171)
Sexe 0.0412 0.3924 0.0738 q9 -1.7349 -2.3641 -2.3985
(0.8915) (0.1391) (0.7711) (0.0190) (0.0002) (0.0002)
treatment -0.5951 -1.5940 -1.1804 q10 -1.7381 -1.9947 -1.9420
(0.2896) (0.0048) (0.0485) (0.0188) (0.0011) (0.0020)
sextreatment 0.1398 -0.0941 0.2821 q2t 0.8536 1.7735 0.0282
(0.7124) (0.7764) (0.3801) (0.2290) (0.0152) (0.9776)
Age 0.00302 0.00324 -0.00832 q3t 0.8063 2.5884 1.5503
(0.9108) (0.8895) (0.7117) (0.3400) (0.0018) (0.0441)
Education 0.0507 0.0773 0.0350 q4t 0.7633 2.1252 1.5607
(0.4971) (0.2327) (0.5801) (0.2941) (0.0032) (0.0345)
q2 0.2337 -0.3636 1.2972 q5t 0.7561 2.3399 1.6269
(0.6766) (0.5381) (0.1441) (0.4115) (0.0014) (0.0279)
q3 -1.3719 -2.8147 -2.3541 q6t -0.7081 1.2329 0.6230
(0.0447) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.4120) (0.1041) (0.3992)
q4 -0.4377 -1.5713 -1.3416 q7t 1.3228 2.1902 1.2944
(0.4481) (0.0074) (0.0291) (0.0935) (0.0034) (0.0833)
q5 -1.7691 -1.8656 -1.4668 q8t 1.0284 2.2127 1.5161
(0.0167) (0.0019) (0.0171) (0.1977) (0.0026) (0.0404)
q6 -0.7728 -1.8656 -1.3416 q9t 1.0319 2.3218 2.5139
(0.1985) (0.0019) (0.0291) (0.2509) (0.0027) (0.0010)
q7 -1.1124 -1.9534 -1.7502 q10t 1.5328 2.3593 1.6794
(0.0856) (0.0015) (0.0052) (0.0804) (0.0015) (0.0246)
Note: p-values are in brackets.
3.2.2 A different impact between genders
This general picture masks some strong heterogeneity across subjects. We
can control for several sources of heterogeneity. However, the gender vari-
able captures almost all of it. We observe indeed that there is virtually no
improvement in women’s calibration especially when we compare the median
hit rates between the treatments while men increase their median hit rate
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by 0.5 point at the 50% level and by 1 point at the 10% and 90% levels (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3. Hit Rates: Gender Differences
The diﬀerence in interval width between the control and the training
treatments seems to be larger for men than for women, indicating that men
learned more than women to reduce their overconﬁdence.Using a Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test, we ﬁnd that 10% conﬁdence intervals are signiﬁcantly
wider for the trained group respectively for ﬁve questions out of ten and
zero question out of ten for men and women. Let us notice that in the
trained group both men and women had more than one correct answer inside
their 10% intervals exhibiting underconﬁdent miscalibration. As a result,
an increase of 10% intervals causes an aggravation of underconﬁdence. For
50% intervals, the width increases signiﬁcantly between the control and the
training treatments respectively for two and six questions out of ten. Finally,
concerning 90% intervals, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant in three cases and four
cases out of ten respectively for women and men.
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3.3 What happened during the training session ?
The training period had an impact on men but almost no eﬀect on women.
It could be interesting to use the results from the training period to get an
insight into the nature of the learning process that arose. In order to be able
to measure learning during the training period, the order of the 20 questions
was reversed for half of the subjects.
It appears that during the training process, some learning took place. We
measured learning at this stage by comparing the width of the intervals pro-
vided for the same question by subjects from the two groups corresponding
to the two orders of appearance of the questions. We found that there was a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the width of the intervals between the two groups for
seven questions out of twenty, each going in the sense of longer intervals for
the group who answered the question later in the training session. For exam-
ple, the intervals provided for question 18 were wider for the group who had
the regular order of questions than for those who had the reversed order (for
whom question 18 was actually the third one they had to answer). It seems
noteworthy that six out of the seven questions which subjects with more
training answered with wider intervals were economic knowledge questions.
We regressed a variable equal to the interval width chosen over the inter-
val width of the interval of reference on the intercept, a dummy indicating the
gender ("sex"),the age, the level of education, a dummy indicating whether
the question appeared early during the training session ("exp"), the inter-
action between "exp" and "sex" ("expsex"), the ranking announced to the
subject after he had answered the previous question ("Rank-1"),the gap be-
tween the midpoint of the interval provided and the correct answer as a proxy
for the ignorance ("gap") and dummies for the diﬀerent questions (See Table
3). We added "gap" in the regressors so as to take in the eﬀect of knowl-
edge on the choice of the interval width. Any residual eﬀect of "Rank-1" can
therefore be attributed to competition, ie the eﬀect of the announced rank
on the decision to take more or less risk.
Women are found to provide signiﬁcantly (p-value<0.0001) narrower in-
tervals than men. "Age" is also highly signiﬁcant and negative. "Exp" is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant (p-value=0.0622) indicating that subjects who answered
a question later in the training period tend to provide wider intervals. We
found that the coeﬃcient of "gap" is positive and highly signiﬁcant showing
that the less people knew the answer, the wider the interval they provided.
The coeﬃcient of "Rank-1" was found to be positive and highly signiﬁcant
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Table 3. Regression of IW/IWref and ICA)
Variable IW/IWref ICA Variable IW/IWref ICA
Intercept 41.12421 1.2527 q8 -1.68538 -0.0629
(<.0001) (0.2431) (0.8203) (0.9491)
Sexe -6.99129 0.1719 q9 -19.85722 0.8560
(<.0001) (0.4594) (0.0076) (0.3943)
Age -0.46804 -0.00749 q10 -11.83878 0.3414
(0.0011) (0.7437) (0.1108) (0.7303)
Education 0.31946 -0.0545 q11 5.27825 0.1627
(0.4400) (0.3976) (0.4797) (0.8694)
exp 2.47820 0.4154 q12 -6.28333 -0.6213
(0.0622) (0.0473) (0.3983) (0.5272)
expsex -0.12668 -1.0866 q13 -5.66640 1.0783
(0.9512) (0.0007) (0.4491) (0.3119)
gap 1.95204 -0.8905 q14 -6.67250 -0.0545
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3686) (0.9558)
rang_1 0.80443 -0.0154 q15 -16.97609 0.5789
(0.0018) (0.6979) (0.0223) (0.5612)
q2 -23.23853 5.4903 q16 -11.00649 0.4695
(0.0041) (<.0001) (0.1385) (0.6355)
q3 5.05854 0.0202 q17 -8.28099 0.2700
(0.4957) (0.9836) (0.2645) (0.7845)
q4 2.15180 0.4241 q18 -14.72562 1.6759
(0.7724) (0.6688) (0.0476) (0.1118)
q5 3.09015 0.1231 q19 -20.02148 0.9432
(0.6770) (0.9007) (0.0071) (0.3492)
q6 -1.74616 0.7506 q20 -9.39033 2.4406
(0.8140) (0.4522) (0.2106) (0.0269)
q7 -17.73803 2.4098
(0.0180) (0.0253)
Note: p-values are in brackets.
too. It seems that the announcement of a bad ranking leads subjects to take
less risk and provide wider intervals.
The logistic regression of the probability to catch the correct answer in
one’s interval (ICA) on the same variables (See Table 3) reveals that while
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"sex" "age" and "rank-1" are not signiﬁcant, "gap" is negative and highly
signiﬁcant showing that the more ignorant the subject was about the answer,
the less chance for the correct answer to belong to his interval. "exp" is found
to be positive (p-value=0.0473) and "expsex" negative (p-value=0.0007) in-
dicating that, overall, having answered a greater number of questions pre-
viously tends to increase one’s chances to catch the correct answer in his
interval but the opposite is actually true for men. We tried to search for
explanations for the fact that women failed to learn from our training period
while men did. It seems likely that the explanation lies in what happens
in the training period. The diﬀerent possible explanations are: a stronger
reaction to competition for men than for women, a longer time for decision,
the fact that money is a stronger incentive for men... Unfortunately, the too
scarce data available to us made it impossible to reach a deﬁnitive conclu-
sion. Our results could indicate that men used more the training session to
experiment diﬀerent strategies and took more risk to go up in the ranking
and, as a result, beneﬁted more from the training period than women who
were more cautious. This is in line with the idea of Gail Osten, author of
"What Can Male Traders Learn from Successful Women...And Vice Versa"
who says that "women, particularly when starting out, often are more timid
in trading and more conservative in the use of their money". ŞMen, on the
other hand, seem not to have the same reservation or feeling of guilt regard-
ing their initial funding or the price of tuition,Ť according to Barb Magio,
a trader, educator and moderator in woodiescciclub.com. ŞThey take these
losses merely as part of the learning process and seem to feel less guilt or
necessity to explain why instant proﬁtability is lacking.Ť
To conclude, providing monetary incentives helps reduce men’s overcon-
ﬁdent miscalibration but leaves women’s miscalibration unchanged.
4 Discussion
This paper contributes to a literature interested in cognitive biases having
economic consequences. We focus on miscalibration, a very robust bias corre-
lated with losses on experimental ﬁnancial markets and bad entrepreneurship.
In line with the existing literature on miscalibration, our subjects strongly
suﬀer from the miscalibration bias, their 50% and 90% intervals being too
narrow (overconﬁdent miscalibration). We ﬁnd that subject’s 10% intervals
are too wide (underconﬁdent miscalibration). These results are widespread in
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the population according to the literature and there are very few exceptions.
Furthermore, subjects overestimate their underconﬁdence and underestimate
their overconﬁdence. The fact that people overestimate their underconﬁdent
miscalibration could mean that they do not consider it as a bias. Maybe
being too cautious is seen as a good thing. Previous attempts to reduce
miscalibration relied on very long and repetitive training periods.
We ﬁnd that men’s calibration can be improved by a thirty-minute train-
ing period punishing miscalibrated behavior by money losses, while women’s
cannot. The incentives we implemented had no eﬀect on women. This diﬀer-
ence in the impact of monetary incentives between genders is a key interest
of Niederle and her coauthors (?Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Niederle and
Yestrumskas, 2007) who show that it can be detrimental to welfare. Indeed,
they highlight the fact that highly able women do not enter tournaments as
often as they should while low performing men enter too often. To overcome
this issue, Niederle et al. (2007)studied the eﬀect of aﬃrmative action in fa-
vor of women and found that it increased the number of women willing to
enter the tournament and decreased the number of men, more than what
would be predicted solely by the change in the probability of winning. There
are probably other incentives one could think of that would have a stronger
eﬀect on women than on men and which could therefore beneﬁt welfare.
5 Conclusion
We ﬁnd that people who went through the training session provide wider
intervals at 10, 50 and 90% than those who did not. This result is not always
signiﬁcant but it is quite robust as subjects from the control group never
provided signiﬁcantly wider intervals than trained subjects. Moreover, our
training signiﬁcantly increases a subject’s chance to catch the correct answer
in his interval. This results in an improvement of calibration at the 50% and
90% levels but the underconﬁdent miscalibration observed at the 10% level
is made worse by the training. Nevertheless, men seem to have learned more
from the training than women, as the increase in interval width between the
treatments is greater for men than for women in most cases. As a result, the
diﬀerence in hit rates between the control and the trained group is greater
for men, who become more cautious and increase their hit rates at the three
levels while women’s hit rates are virtually the same across treatments.
Some consequences can be drawn. It is unlikely that miscalibration disap-
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pears in a market environment, since we provided the kind of incentives that
are expected on real markets. According to our results, real traders are likely
to underestimate the risk they take when they think they invested in a very
secure asset. Symmetrically they take less risks than they think when they
invest in risky assets. So, the overall eﬀect of miscalibration on real markets
is ambiguous. Our results also suggest that men may be more successful
in learning calibration. Women traders may need a longer king of training
which would give them more time to get rid of their overcautiousness.
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Appendices
A Instructions
A.1 Trained group
You are about to participate to an experiment aiming at evaluating your
ability to calibrate risk. This experiment will be divided in several steps.
A.1.1 First step
In this ﬁrst step, you will have to answer a set of twenty questions by
providing an interval for each question. At the beginning of this step, you
will be endowed with 2000 points which will be converted to euros at the end
of the experiment. For each of the 20 questions, 100 points will be at stake.
You will have to keep the more points you can.
For each question, you will be provided with an interval of reference including
the correct answer. The interval you will provide will have to be contained
in the interval of reference. Your payoﬀs will be determined as follows:
• If the correct answer does not belong to the interval chosen, you will
lose the 100 points at stake for the question. They will be withdrawn
from your endowment.
• If the correct answer does belong to the interval chosen, the narrower
the interval you chose, the more points you will keep. Your payoﬀs will
depend on the diﬀerence between the length of the interval chosen and
the length of the interval of reference given the following formula:
payment =


−100 ∗ width of the interval provided
width of the interval of reference
if the correct answer belongs
to the interval provided
−100 otherwise
In consequence, the wider the interval chosen, the more chances for the cor-
rect answer to belong to your interval but the fewer the points you will get
to keep if your interval contains the correct answer.
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Symmetrically, the narrower the interval chosen, the less chances for the
correct answer to belong to your interval but the more points you will get to
keep if your interval contains the correct answer.
After each question, you will see the correct answer, the intervals chosen
for the same question by the subjects present in the lab (ranked from the
narrower to the wider) as well as the number of points they kept.
Example: For the question, "How old was John Fitzgerald Kennedy when
he died?", if the interval of reference is [30;80]:
• If you give the interval [49;54], your potential loss is 10: if the correct
answer belongs to the interval [49;54], you will keep 90 points out of the
100 points at stake for this question. Here, your actual loss would be
100 points as the correct answer, 46, does not belong to your interval.
Hence, you would have lost the 100 points at stake for this question.
• If you give the interval [40;65], your potential loss is 50 and it corre-
sponds to your actual loss as the correct answer belongs to your interval.
In this case, you would have kept 50 points out of the 100 points at
stake for this question.
A.1.2 Second step
In this second step, you will also be compensated but you will only be in-
formed of the details of the remuneration afterwards. You will have to answer
to a set of 10 questions by providing your best estimate of the answer and
conﬁdence intervals, ie a lower and an upper bound corresponding to a cer-
tain level of conﬁdence that the correct answer falls between these 2 values,
knowing that:
• The narrower the interval you will provide, the more chances for the
correct answer to fall outside.
• The wider the interval you will provide, the more chances for the correct
answer to fall inside.
For each question, you will have to give intervals corresponding to 3 diﬀerent
levels of conﬁdence (10%, 50% and 90%). To help you calibrate the risk, here
are 3 diﬀerent and equivalent ways to understand what a 10% interval is:
A 10% interval corresponds to a lower and an upper values such that:
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1. You are 10% conﬁdent that the correct answer lies between these 2
values.
2. For 10 questions, 1 correct answer on average belongs to the interval
provided and 9 correct answers out of 10 on average fall outside of their
interval.
3. You think there are 9 chances out of 10 for the correct answer to fall
outside your interval.
Example of question: What was the year of Vincent Auriol’s election as
President?
If you give the value 1927 as your best estimation of the answer and the
intervals [1921,1930] at 10%, [1915,1935] at 50% and [1915,1949] at 90%, it
means that:
• Your best estimate of the year Vincent Auriol was elected is 1927.
• You are 10% conﬁdent he was elected between 1921 and 1930.
• You think there is 1 chance out of 2 that he was elected before 1915 or
after 1935.
• You are 90% sure that his election happened between 1915 and 1949.
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Considering the 10 questions you just answered, please evaluate:
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 10% intervals you
provided (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 50% intervals you
provided (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 90% intervals you
provided (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
As well as:
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 10% intervals provided
by the average subject (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 50% intervals provided
by the average subject (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 90% intervals provided
by the average subject (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
For each correct evaluation, you will earn 100 points.
Finally, you will have to make 2 choices each time between 2 bets. For each
of these 2 choices, you will earn 300 points if what you bet on happens.
A.2 Control group
You are about to participate to an experiment aiming at evaluating your
ability to calibrate risk.
You will be compensated but you will only be informed of the details of
the remuneration afterwards. You will have to answer to a set of 10 questions
by providing your best estimate of the answer and conﬁdence intervals, ie a
lower and an upper bound corresponding to a certain level of conﬁdence that
the correct answer falls between these 2 values, knowing that:
• The narrower the interval you will provide, the more chances for the
correct answer to fall outside.
• The wider the interval you will provide, the more chances for the correct
answer to fall inside.
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For each question, you will have to give intervals corresponding to 3 diﬀerent
levels of conﬁdence (10%, 50% and 90%). To help you calibrate the risk, here
are 3 diﬀerent and equivalent ways to understand what a 10% interval is:
A 10% interval corresponds to a lower and an upper values such that:
1. You are 10% conﬁdent that the correct answer lies between these 2
values.
2. For 10 questions, 1 correct answer on average belongs to the interval
provided and 9 correct answers out of 10 on average fall outside of their
interval.
3. You think there are 9 chances out of 10 for the correct answer to fall
outside your interval.
Example of question: What was the year of Vincent Auriol’s election as
President?
If you give the value 1927 as your best estimation of the answer and the
intervals [1921,1930] at 10%, [1915,1935] at 50% and [1915,1949] at 90%, it
means that:
• Your best estimate of the year Vincent Auriol was elected is 1927.
• You are 10% conﬁdent he was elected between 1921 and 1930.
• You think there is 1 chance out of 2 that he was elected before 1915 or
after 1935.
• You are 90% sure that his election happened between 1915 and 1949.
Considering the 10 questions you just answered, please evaluate:
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 10% intervals you
provided (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 50% intervals you
provided (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 90% intervals you
provided (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
As well as:
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• The number of correct answers falling inside the 10% intervals provided
by the average subject (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 50% intervals provided
by the average subject (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
• The number of correct answers falling inside the 90% intervals provided
by the average subject (please enter a number between 0 and 10).
For each correct evaluation, you will earn 100 points.
Finally, you will have to make 2 choices each time between 2 bets. For each
of these 2 choices, you will earn 300 points if what you bet on happens.
B Questions
Questions of the Training Session:
1. How long, in months, does the gestation of an asian elephant last? (
22)
[2,50]
2. What is the diameter of the Moon in kilometers? (3476)
[10,150000]
3. What is the distance (in Kilometers) between London and Tokyo?
(9559)
[300,40000]
4. What is the depth of the deepest point in the ocean? (11033)
[10,65000]
5. What was the age at death of Einstein? (76)
[10,100]
6. How many countries are members of NATO? (26)
[2,200]
7. What is the number (in millions) of inhabitants of Norway? (4,6)
[0.5,150]
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8. In which year was Mozart born? (1756)
[1300,1980]
9. How high (in meters) is the Eiﬀel tower? (324)
[2,4000]
10. How high (in meters) is Mount Blanc? (4808)
[1000,10000]
11. How much (in euros) does the school education until high school grad-
uation (without repeating) of a student cost? (87730)
[500,300000]
12. What is the gross monthly income of the french Prime Minister? (20206)
[1000,80000]
13. What is the percentage of french households accountable for the "Impôt
sur la Fortune"? (1.7%)
[0%,30%]
14. What is the french poverty line (monthly euro amount such that anyone
earning less is considered poor)? (645)
[30,1500]
15. What was the unemployment rate in France for the ﬁrst trimester of
2007? (8.7%)
[0%,40%]
16. What is the after-tax monthly income of a CAPES-holder teacher who
has been teaching for 10 years? (1859)
[600,10000]
17. How much is the "Revenu Minimum d’Insertion" (Minimum insertion
outcome) for a single person with no child? (440.86)
[30,1500]
18. What is the after-tax monthly income of a beginning university lecturer
and researcher? (1655)
[600,10000]
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19. What is the after-tax monthly income of a beginning police oﬃcer?
(1235)
[600,10000]
20. What was the per inhabitant GDP in 2004 in France? (26788)
[100,500000]
Questions of the Calibration Task:
1. What was the age at death of Martin Luther King? (39)
2. How many countries are members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries)? (11)
3. What is the maximal length in meters of a whale? (33)
4. What was the year of Ariane rocket’s ﬁrst launch? (1979)
5. What was the year of JS Bach’s birth? (1685)
6. What is the average after-tax monthly income in France? (1903)
7. What was the unemployment rate in France in 1970? (2.5%)
8. What percentage of the GDP do the taxes and social security contri-
butions represent? (45%)
9. What is the after-tax monthly income of a french congressman? (5177.66)
10. What is the average annual cost for the school system of the education
of a high-school student? (10000)
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